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THE EAST WAS WHAT THE WEST WAS NOT:
AN INTEREST OR A COMMITMENT

A Monograph
by

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Infantry



School of Advanced Military Studies
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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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American defense commitments in the Pacific have not changed significantly from the end of WWII. Our troop concentrations, with the exception of the Vietnam War, have not changed since the Korean War. However, Asian nationalism has grown significantly, and as stated earlier, the United States economic center of gravity thus her national interests have shifted to the Pacific.

Navy, Air Force and Marine planners have long recognized the risks inherent in large scale stationing of forces in Korea. Their forward basing provides increased flexibility for the PACOM CINC in accomplishing his duties throughout the Pacific. U.S. Army commitments to Korea, have absorbed significant amounts of resources and provided a relatively inflexible Army response capability. This coupled with awkward command relationships involving Korea, Japan and WESTCOM provide less than adequate army component representation at PACOM headquarters.

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
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ABSTRACT

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This monograph will examine the economic realities of the present to substantiate the importance of the Pacific Rim to the United States' well-being; document the U.S. Army's role in American experiences in this part of the world; review our current military command and control relationships in the Pacific, emphasizing the Army's commitments; and conclude with recommendations for improved US Army force posturing to enhance flexibility, responsiveness and adaptability.

If it is true, "the flag follows the dollar", today's Army leadership is required to continuously analyze and identify the vital interests of the United States and publish planning guidance appropriate to this analysis. Recognition of social factors such as growing nationalism, reflected by the emergence of the United States' core value of democracy, need to be recognized and actions taken at the front-end of these changes to provide for the safe guarding of national security and treasure. Failure to adapt to these changes leads to dangerous troop positioning, awkward command structures, and unacceptable risk to national security. The United States Army has fought three wars in the Pacific, two since 1950. Yet our global troop dispositions remain relatively unchanged since the end of WW II.

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EMERGENCE OF THE PACIFIC RIM

It has become a well-documented fact, the United States' economic "Center of Gravity" has shifted from Europe to the Pacific. The emergence of Japan as an economic superpower, closely followed by the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, the Peoples Republic of China and the growing importance of other ASEAN nations - Malaysia, Thailand, Phillipines, Australia and New Zealand - should cause the United States to evaluate its strategic posture in light of the changing circumstances affecting its vital national interests. The economic lifeblood of America is intertwined with the Pacific Rim. Our military posture is critical to the continuance of this relationship and as such deserves continual review.

This paper will examine the economic realities of the present to substantiate the importance of the Pacific Rim to the United States' well-being; document the U.S. Army's role in American experiences in this part of the world; review our current military command and control relationships in the Pacific, emphasizing the Army's commitments; and conclude with an analysis of the Army's current posture against the criteria of flexibility, responsiveness and adaptability.

The United States has always been fascinated by the economic potential of the Far East. From the "Opening of Japan" by Commodore Perry American business interests have dreamed of the potential markets in China, the exploitation of raw materials and the benefits of a cheap labor force available to support emerging American economic fortunes. America was not alone in these endeavors. Portugal, Holland and Spain were the first great maritime nations to develop interests in the Pacific. Following them, Great Britain, Germany and Russia competed with the United States in carving out significant areas of influence in the region. The potential economic importance of this region never fully materialized until the end of WW II and United States post-war policies were paramount in this development.

As Paul Kennedy summarizes in his book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, economic growth in this vast area has been stimulated by a happy combination of factors: a spectacular rise in industrial productivity by export-oriented societies, in turn, leading to great increases in foreign trade, shipping, and financial services; a marked move into the newer technologies as well as into cheaper, labor-intensive manufactures; and an immensely successful effort to increase agricultural output (especially grains and livestock) faster than the total

population growth. Each success has beneficially interacted with the others, to produce a rate of economic expansion which has far eclipsed that of the traditional western powers ... in recent years.¹

Factors supporting these claims are:²

- The combined gross domestic product of the Asian-Pacific countries (excluding the United States) was a mere 7.8 percent of world GDP in 1960. By 1982, it had more than doubled, to 16.4 percent, and since then the areas growth rates have exceeded those of Europe, the United States, and the USSR by ever wider margins.
- American trade with Asia and the Pacific was only 48 percent of that with Europe (OECD members) in 1960, but had risen to 122 percent of American-European trade by 1983.
- Correspondingly, economic and population distributions in the United States have migrated in the direction of the Pacific.
- Economic predictions state that the entire Pacific region, which now possesses 43 percent of the world's GNP, will enjoy a good 50 percent of it by the year 2000.

If it is true, "the flag follows the dollar", today's Army leadership is required to continuously analyze and identify the vital interests of the United States and to publish planning guidance appropriate to this analysis. Recognition of social factors such as growing nationalism, reflected by the emergence of the United States' core value of democracy, need to be recognized and actions taken at the

front-end of these changes to provide for the safeguarding of national security and treasure. Failure to adapt to these changes leads to dangerous troop positioning, awkward command structures, and unacceptable risk to national security. The United States Army has fought three wars in the Pacific, two since 1950. Yet our global troop dispositions remain relatively unchanged since the end of WW II.

The ARMY ON THE PACIFIC FRONTIER

The United States military posture in the Pacific can best be understood through an examination of the perceptions and realities of East versus West. As the military of any nation reflects its society we should begin by examining the sociological viewpoints that formed our relationships.

Edward Said in his 1978 work, "Orientalism", makes the point that western perceptions drew on 18th century European thought. He concludes, "the orient was not so much a real world of Oriental people but a creation of Western minds preoccupied with Europe." Expanding this idea he goes on to explain that the idea of Orientalism was given its definition and character by non-orientals, and the Orient was, of necessity, represented in terms of the more familiar west. The East was what the West was not.³

Americans embellished this concept with their own peculiar elements. The American society, ever conscious of their freedoms, economic prosperity and unique political system, regarded their lifestyle as inherently good and most advanced of all. They believed in their destiny as a "Redeemer Nation."⁴ If, as they believed, theirs was a most perfect society then it was America's destiny to serve as a

role model for others. Otherwise, so the thought went, America would be a singular exception in a sea of wilderness. It was America's manifest destiny to ensure the transformation of other less fortunate societies.

Numerous manifestations of this idea can be found in American history. Missionary zeal and mercantilism in China and expansionism throughout the Pacific are all driven by this underlying philosophy. The Army was an instrument used by the nation as it played out its role as a "Redeemer Nation." The influence of these ideas was far out of proportion to the actual military power of the United States in the Pacific and particularly in East Asia.

THE UNITED STATES ARMY in the PACIFIC - 1899-1939

The Spanish American War and the subsequent war in the Phillipines shook the Army out of its Indian War doldrums. After the Civil War the nation devoted its effort to repairing the economic fabric of a nation rent by war. Consequently the Army was demobilized, budgets reduced, and the Army directed to focus its efforts on the Indian Wars and to the support of the westward expansion of an isolationist nation. While the Indian Wars sharpened Army skills in small unit guerrilla operations no doctrine was devised to guide military campaigns against the Indians.⁵ The Army's leadership was cognizant of the lack of development in the nation's armed forces as reflected in Secretary of the Army, Elihu Root's, criticism condemning past administrations and congresses for forcing the Army to concentrate on meeting the demands of day-to-day routine. War, Root concluded, had no great influence on shaping the Army; the unfortunate result was an elaborate system adapted to financial accountability and economy of expenditure.⁶

Commodore George Dewey's defeat of the Spanish fleet at Manila presented the United States with an opportunity for expansionism that, driven by their "Redeemer Nation" outlook, they could not ignore. These unexpected

circumstances and an unwanted follow-on war with the Philippines kept the standing Army tied down overseas for the foreseeable future. The situation was further complicated by the 1900 Boxer Rebellion in China. The Americans committed 15,000 troops as part of the allied force used to stabilize China's internal politics.⁷ These developments and the Army's other commitments in Cuba and Puerto Rico forced the development of procedures to command and control and support large standing forward deployed military forces.

War in the Philippines erupted in February 1899. The Army had 21,000 regulars and volunteers in the Philippines at the start of the war; a strength totally inadequate to cope with the new situation.⁸ While Congress began to increase end strength authorizations to support the United States expanding Pacific empire, it was Secretary of the Army Root, and Commanding General of the Army Miles who were instrumental in educating administrations in the fundamental truths about expansion:

The events of the past two years and a half have resulted in a condition that the nation must be prepared to meet. The need for an efficient and well organized force for an indefinite period in the future is most obvious, and organizations of such a force cannot wisely be avoided.⁹

The problem faced by the Army in this period was the extensive use of volunteers at the expense of a standing force of regulars. The two year volunteer, prevalent at this time, allowed only an effective one year overseas tour. The problems of personnel turnover and high incidents of tropical disease led to degraded morale. The quality of the force was as much of a problem as was quantity. What was needed was a standing force large enough to provide a permanent rotating reserve.

Congress recognized the problems facing the "frontier army of the Pacific" and in February 1901 passed a new manpower act. The Act of 1901 authorized an increase in the peacetime strength of the Regular Army to 100,619 officers and men, provided for a staff to serve with troops, and permitted the raising of a force of Filipinos and a Puerto Rican regiment.¹⁰ Corresponding increases in spending began an upward trend reversing post Civil War reductions.

There were three major developments for the Army resulting from their initial experiences in the Pacific. The first was the development of a worldwide logistical support base and accompanying capabilities. This became particularly true as the Army supported their efforts in China. Secondly, as a result of the guerrilla experience in

the Phillipines, the Army sharpened its skills in small unit tactics and its capability to participate in civil and governmental activities. The latter proved especially helpful as MacArthur exercised his post war responsibilities in Japan as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). Finally, through some far sighted leadership in the Army of the 1900's, Secretary of the Army, Elihu Root led the way to significant changes in the Army's education programs and the study of the emerging military sciences prevalent in Europe.

Prior to the events in the Phillipines and China the Army had no interest in the Pacific. They were a continental force concerned with the defense of the Nation and not guided by the principals of such globalists as Alfred Thayer Mahan. However, the influences of the American society began to influence Army thinking as the lure of opportunism grew. Indications of this thinking appeared in a typical article in the Army and Navy Journal in 1901.

While it is true that a people have a certain right to say what shall be done in a political way on their own soil, it is equally true that a narrow-minded race have not the right to shut out from use by other peoples vast natural resources...11

The Army leadership vacillated between their continental defense responsibilities and the "sharing of the white man's burden" resolving itself to a long slow retreat back to the continental philosophy. The Navy, following the teachings of Mahan and the demands of American mercantilism, continued their development of the Pacific strategy beginning with the development of the "FLAN ORANGE" in 1906.¹²

DEFENSE OF THE PACIFIC EMPIRE

American civil and military leaders viewed Japan as the most likely threat in the Pacific by 1906. Events shaping this thinking stemmed from the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905 and the shifting influence centers resulting from the Boxer Rebellion in China. Japan, Great Britain and the United States became the dominant forces in the Pacific. The defense of the Phillipines, particularly Manila and its harbor, became the overriding strategic concern of the United States.

At the direction of President Theodore Roosevelt the Army and Navy developed what was to become known as the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Plan ORANGE. The basic assumption in this plan was the Phillipines would become the initial target of Japanese expansionism. Consequently, defense of the Phillipines and retention of the Manila harbor by the Army was paramount. The retention of the harbor was critical as the Navy still did not possess a two-ocean fleet and the Panama Canal was not in existence. Pearl Harbor became the main Navy base in the Pacific with a line of communications running through Guam. German occupation of the Marianas, Marshall and Caroline islands

protected the Navy's flank as they concentrated their battle fleet and steamed to Manila to seek battle with Japanese naval forces threatening the Philippines. The general scheme outlined in PLAN ORANGE remained in effect until 1941.

Events leading up to WW I forced Army planners to refocus their thinking. War on the continent of Europe placed Pacific war planning on the back burner. The results of the war and a consequent reevaluation of the far east presented a different set of circumstances drastically altering the Army's approach to defense of the Philippines and U.S. interests in China. Japan emerged from WW I as the dominant power in the Pacific. Japan captured the German island possessions north of the equator and expanded her influence in China. The results of these acquisitions was a 3000 mile eastward expansion of Japanese influence and a reduction of United States bastions in the Pacific to weak outposts thousands of miles inside Japanese-controlled domain.¹³

The United States withdrew from strategic planning at the conclusion of WW I and retreated to its isolationist posture. Accompanying this mindset was the reduction of defense expenditures and the accompanying shortfall in the

Army's ability to carry out the demands of Plan ORANGE. The philosophy of peace through arms limitations drove diplomatic relations and laid the groundwork for the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922 between Japan, the United States, and Great Britain. The infamous 5-5-3 ratio of capital ships to the naval forces of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan was developed. The results of this formula allowed the Japanese to concentrate naval forces in the Pacific while Great Britain and the United States were forced to spread forces between their two ocean areas of interest. Additionally, much to the detriment of the United States, was the proviso restricting the development of new naval facilities or the improvement of existing ones in the Pacific.¹⁴

International events continued to develop further complicating the Army's tenuous positions in east Asia. In 1931 the Japanese entered Manchuria threatening Army forces stationed in China and fueling Western fears of Japanese expansionism. Secondly, the emergence of Adolph Hitler and Benito Mussolini significantly threatened European stability. Finally, the long sought-after Philippine independence came closer to fruition with the passing of the Tydings - Mc Duffie Act in 1934. The Act promised complete independence ten years after approval of a Philippine

Commonwealth Government. However, it also committed the United States to the defense of the Phillipines until full independence was achieved.

Army strategists, concerned with exposed U.S. forward deployed forces, published strategic assessments warning of the fallacies inherent in PLAN ORANGE requiring the defense of Manila Bay in anticipation of the arrival of the Navy. Continuing U.S. curtailment of military expenditures following the end of WW I led to the inescapable conclusion that American strategy must be reviewed. Defending the Phillipines was simply not in the vital interest of the United States.

The United States, as a result of these ongoing strategic assessments, was faced with two choices. The first option was to reinforce their Pacific posture. Unfortunately the Washington Naval Treaties, and a desire to avoid confrontation with an expansionist Japan made this course undesirable. The second option, favored by Army planners, was to abandon the Phillipines after negotiating their neutrality and concentrate their strength along a strategic triangle formed by Alaska, Hawaii, and anchored in the south by Panama. The debate raged between the Army -- eager to rationalize its position -- and the Navy --

reluctant to sacrifice their Pacific bases. The compromise reached in 1938 led to the development of the "RAINBOW PLANS". The "RAINBOW PLANS" assumed war against an alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan and emphasized the defense of the Atlantic area and the Panama Canal. By 1939 American continental strategy had reemerged and strategic planning was again based on the principal of "Europe First."

The conclusion of this review of the American presence in the Pacific shows a growth in interest with a lack of commitment to East Asia. The expansionist drives of the United States from 1898 through the 1930s were driven by mercantilism, missionary zeal and outright expansionism. Of particular importance in the understanding of this period was however, a lack of commitment on the part of the American population to a long term relationship with Asia and the Pacific Rim. America refused to abandon the belief in their European heritage and continued their belief that "the east was what the west was not."

POST WORLD WAR II

There have been two primary themes in United States actions in East Asia since the ending of WW II. First among these is the often discussed need to contain communism and the spread of the communist monolithic power often believed to be represented by the Sino-Soviet monolith of the 1950s. The second, only now being recognized or accepted by American strategists, is the emerging nationalism resulting from the break up of the pre WW II colonial empires of the Dutch, British, French and Japanese. In understanding the U.S. Army's role in the Pacific it is necessary to review the actions and the thinking that took place subsequent to 1945 that postured the Army in its current locations and responsibilities.

As always occurs in the affairs of the United States the cry of "bring the boys back home" played a significant role in the actions of American foreign policy. Despite massive reductions in military presence and accompanying budgets, economic and political stakes in East Asia grew in importance. Military forces across the Pacific were concentrated: 21 percent of the Army was in Japan, nearest the ever growing Soviet threat. A network of strategic

bases were available with the Subic naval complex in the Philippines, potential Army bases in Okinawa, additional air bases in the Philippines and Japan, and the naval base in Yokuska, Japan. JCS planners designated Japan as equal in strategic importance to Great Britain as a base for anti-Soviet war.¹⁵

Long before WW II ended American strategic planners viewed the Soviet Union as the only possible major adversary in a future war. This assessment was particularly applicable to the Pacific as the United States viewed the happenings in China and stumbled over the future of Korea. Additionally, their concern over communist imperialism clouded American reaction to the nationalism of Southeast Asia and influenced their reluctant support of French reestablishment of their pre - WW II Indo-China colonies.

The unimpressive performance of the Chiang Kai-shek Nationalist regime did little to allay U.S. concerns about stability in East Asia. Compounding the issue was the growing concern of a Mao-Stalin relationship creating a mass army, supported by a large industrial base, all weather Pacific ports and the Soviet atomic bomb. Coupling these concerns with the public mistrust of the recently defeated Japanese brought forward disturbing memories of the recent

Japanese imperial expansionism precipitating WW II. Soviet, on again, off again, actions in Manchuria, their protracted occupation of North Korea, and the conclusion of the Soviet-Sino alliance in 1950 further validated Washington's sense of threat.¹⁶

Military leaders of the post - WW II era played a larger role in the commitment of the U.S. to the Far East than did their predecessors in 1902. Probably the most influential spokesman of the era was General Douglas MacArthur. The records of his appointments with distinguished visitors of every sort speaks for itself. Naval spokesmen, recognizing the strategic value of the island bases in controlling the Pacific were also quite outspoken in their views to maintain the U.S. presence in this part of the world. Policy planning groups in Washington founded by the Roosevelt administration continued to wield great influence in the civilian sector. Certainly American policy and strategy toward post - WW II Korea, Formosa, and Indochina were characterized by sharp disagreements. But those debates focused on how, not whether, the United States should act to keep those territories free of Soviet or Communist influence.¹⁷

THE CHINA STORY

Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang (KMT) were driven from mainland China in May 1949. Public and political outcry was immediate and vociferous. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson described the China debacle in a 1,054 page White Paper issued by the State Department on August 5th of that year. In his paper Acheson conceded that the worlds largest nation had fallen into Communist hands. Three American generals - Joseph Stilwell, Patrick J. Hurley, and George Marshall - had tried in vain to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to break the power of his KMT warlords and rid the Nationalist army of corruption. Over two billion dollars of U.S. aid, as much as Japan had received, had gone to China since V-J Day. Virtually all of it had been wasted. Over 75% of the arms shipped to the KMT had wound up in Mao's hands.¹⁸ Interestingly when looking at Viet Nam, as we will later, Acheson's introductory comments in the White Paper are prophetic.

"The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ... result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result. ... It was the product of internal Chinese forces, which this country tried to influence but could not."¹⁹

With the fall of China, U.S. Far East policy became fair game for the Republican critics in Washington. Debate raged as to the appropriate U.S. position regarding Formosa. Clear sighted objective analysis desperately needed at this time was clouded by rhetoric from congressional leaders anxious to regain political power from the long Democratic reign of Roosevelt and Truman. The litany ran: "The greatest Kremlin asset in our history has been the pro-communist group in the State Department who promoted at every opportunity the Communist cause in China." Joe McCarthy would add; "...the administration was one of egg sucking phony liberals whose pitiful squealing would hold sacrosanct those Communists and queers who had sold China into atheistic slavery."²⁰ As the debate continued in Washington the Army, on paper, consisted of four divisions and a regimental combat team performing occupation duty in Japan. As in the U.S. previous experience with large Army forces in the Pacific these troops had in the words of William Dean, one of their commanders, "become accustomed to Japanese girlfriends, plenty of beer, and servants to shine their boots."²¹

THE KOREA STORY

Major policy conferences governing the conduct of WW II demonstrate the lack of specificity in thinking that troubled American policy in the post-war Pacific. At Cairo in 1943 the Big Four had pledged themselves to Korean independence "in due course." At Yalta FDR had suggested a four-power trustee for the country. After a general discussion, however, the matter had been dropped. The Potsdam proclamation had nebulously promised that steps leading to its autonomy "shall be carried out."²² Stalin began sending troops to Korea the day after he declared war on Japan. A week after the Missouri surrender ceremony, American troops arrived to join the Russians in disarming local Japanese forces. The Red Army, which had already occupied Seoul and Inchon, retired north of the 38th Parallel, leaving MacArthur's men to receive the surrender of Nipponese units in the more populous half of the peninsula.²³

As the story goes; "... several one-star generals hurried into the Pentagon with the statement, 'We have got to divide Korea. Where can we divide it?' A colonel with experience in the Far East protested to his superiors, 'You can't do that. Korea is a social and economic unit. There

is no place to divide it.' The generals insisted that it had to be done and the colonel replied that it could not be done. Their answer was, 'We have got to divide Korea and it has to be done by four o'clock this afternoon.'"24 In his memoirs Dean Acheson writes: "A young officer recently returned to the Pentagon, Dean Rusk from the Chinese theater, found an administrative dividing line along the 38th Parallel."25

The division of Korea was accomplished with no forethought. The Russians were in the north and the United States in the south. The Russians installed Kim Il Sung, a former Major in the Red Army, as premier. The United States supported Syngman Rhee in the south. United Nations plans for unification and elections went unheeded. The super powers faced each other across an administrative boundary unsupported by history, culture, or economic necessity. General Douglas MacArthur's comment as to the situation fell on deaf ears, "... the country was not a proper place for the employment of American troops because stationing United States ground troops in continental Asia involved inherent danger. If left there they might be trapped."26

The United States announced little interest in the defense of Korea. Eisenhower, Leahy, Nimitz, and Carl

Spaatz reported to the President in September 1947, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, from the standpoint of military strategy the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea." In April 1948, Truman declared that military action by either side of the divided country would not constitute a "casus belli" for the United States.²⁷ In many minds the green light for the North Korean invasion of the south was signaled when Secretary of State, Acheson said at a National Press Club event, "... America's line of defense runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus (Okinawa)... The defense perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. So far as the military security of the United States is concerned" -- and here he had Formosa and Korea in mind -- "it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack." He vaguely concluded, "... they" -- Formosa and Korea -- "were entitled to an appeal under the charter of the UN."²⁸ On June 24, 1950, the North Korean Army crossed the 38th Parallel and invaded South Korea. The United States was again at war in the Pacific.

THE VIETNAM STORY

The post-WW II history of Vietnam strikingly represents the emergence of Asian nationalism present in today's world. While the American Army is not the primary focus of this review it certainly paid an enormous sacrifice as a result of the United States failure to understand the social dynamics of the post-war years. It is through this review that the United States overriding concern for the menacing "Red Tide" and non-recognition of Asian nationalism caused the unsatisfactory result of the Vietnam war and has a direct bearing on the analysis required of today's Army leadership in determining their defense planning guidance particularly as it relates to the Pacific.

In understanding Vietnam and its post-war leadership one needs to review the social norms of the society they represent. Vietnam, like most of east Asia, is a product of Imperial China of antiquity. Governmental administrators and popular leadership rose from the mandarin system focused on an educated elite steeped in the Confucian classics and founded on the concept of the "Mandate of Heaven." This ideology has permeated Asia for centuries and as such is the norm in oriental thinking. Oriental societies looked to the

mandarin class for leadership. Ho Chi Minh and his disciples were mandarins.

Ho Chi Minh was born in 1890 as the youngest son of a Confucian scholar-aristocrat. His father, who had been a district magistrate, was dismissed by the French for nationalist activities. Ho made his way to France and settled in Paris during World War I. He joined the French Socialist party because its more radical members were the only French political grouping that seriously advocated independence for the colonies. Ho, driven by the recognition of colonial independence, allied himself with the ongoing political debates of the period involving Lenin and the establishment of the Third International (subsequently known as the Comintern). Lenin's "Thesis on the National and Colonial Questions" convinced Ho of the rightness of his path and led him to be one of the founders of the French Communist Party. Ho actively pursued the anti-colonialist dream in subsequent activities throughout China and Indochina and gathered his disciples along the way. Truong Chinh, the senior theoretician of the party; Le Duc Tho, the deft negotiator whom Henry Kissinger was to meet at the table in Paris; Vo Nguyen Giap, the military leader of modern Vietnam; and Pham Van Dong, one of Ho's closest associates; were all from the indigenous mandarin

society and were an oddity among other Communist parties. Woodside, a Canadian historian, called them "Marxist Mandarins."²⁹

Ho Chi Minh first approached the American government in response to Woodrow Wilson's proclamations in his "Fourteen Points" in the post-WW I deliberations at the Paris Peace Conference where Wilson and the other Allied statesman were negotiating the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations. Wilson said that subject people had a right to self-determination and that in the settlement "of all colonial claims ... the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight" with the claim of the colonial power. Ho, sufficiently impressed with these thoughts, attempted to present a petition listing Vietnamese grievances against the French colonial regime to the American delegation. Neither the Americans nor any other delegation would receive him. Ho discovered that regardless of the high sounding rhetoric, Wilson's self-determination applied only to the Czechs, Poles and other white peoples of Eastern Europe.³⁰

Ho Chi Minh surfaces again in Vietnam's history as the leader of the only viable resistance force against the occupying Japanese during WW II. His organization, a

precursor to the Viet Minh, was operating in the Red river country of North Vietnam and were actively supported by OSS efforts in Indochina. They provided necessary intelligence on Japanese activities in the region and were active in the rescue efforts of downed American pilots. As such, the Vietnamese viewed the American war effort as the foundation for eventual relief from Japanese occupation as well as French colonization.

On August 15, 1945, the day Emperor Hirohito announced the surrender of his country over Radio Tokyo, Ho began asking Truman to make good on his wartime rhetoric. He had the Viet Minh representative in China send a message to Truman through the OSS requesting "the United States, as a champion of democracy" to make Vietnam an American protectorate "on the same status as the Philippines for an undetermined period" before full independence. Two weeks later, on September 2, 1945, the day the Japanese signed the surrender documents on the Battleship Missouri, Ho read the Vietnamese Declaration of Independence to 500,000 people assembled in Hanoi. There was no reply to Ho's message.³¹

President Truman's first major foreign policy speech was made on Navy Day, October 27, 1945. In this speech Truman outlined America's post-war foreign policy. Three

points of this speech were of particular interest to Ho Chi Minh.

- We believe in the eventual return of sovereign rights and self-government to all peoples who have been deprived of them by force.
- We believe that all peoples who are prepared for self-government should be permitted to choose their own form government by their own freely expressed choice, without interference from any foreign source. That is true in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, as well as in the Western Hemisphere.
- We shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power.

The United States then allowed France to represent the Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians on the newly formed United Nations Advisory Commission for the Far East. Ho's protestation that the French had lost all claim to Indochina because of the Vichy France collaboration with the Japanese and the Viet Minh alliance with the United States also went unheeded. Ho sent a total of eleven telegrams and letters to the United States over the next 18 months and all went unanswered.³²

The French immediately reclaimed their colonies in Indochina using American economic backing given for European reconstruction programs. French president, Charles de Gaulle, coerced continuing American aid through veiled threats of French actions (or lack of action) in Europe and

the claim that the French were indeed fighting communist expansionism in the Far East. The United States failed to recognize the leadership of Ho Chi Minh and his associates and the Vietnamese nationalistic fervor. Once again the United States was drawn into war in the Pacific.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

The United States established the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) in 1947 to conduct military operations in the Pacific region. USPACOM's area of responsibility (AOR) covers more than 50 percent of the earth's surface and stretches from the U.S. west coast to the east coast of Africa and from the Arctic to the Antarctic. Three-fifths of the world's population live within this AOR. Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC) is charged with the mission of promoting peace and stability within his AOR as he maintains a capability to defend U.S. interests. To accomplish this mission 368,000 military personnel and 33,000 civilian employees of the Department of Defense are assigned within USPACOM's three service components and two subordinate unified commands: U.S. Forces, Japan, and U.S. Forces, Korea.³³

U.S. PACOM's component commands are U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) and U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM) all headquartered in Hawaii. Interestingly, PACAF and PACFLT have operational control of all forces stationed in the PACOM AOR and represent their component interests in PACOM councils. U.S. Army WESTCOM while serving as the PACOM army component commander does not

have OPCOM or OPCON of forces in 8th U.S. Army in Korea or U.S. Army Japan. In reality, Army participation in FACOM is represented by three different headquarters; United States Army Japan, Eighth United States Army in Korea, and the United States Army Western Command.

The most complex of these organizations is in the Republic of Korea (ROK). Diagrams outlining the Korean-United States military organization is at Appendix A. For the purpose of this analysis the following points suffice.³⁴

- There are two combined commands in Korea, the United Nations Command (UNC) and the Combined Forces Command (CFC).
- The senior U. S. military officer in Korea wears seven hats: Commander in Chief United Nations Command (CINCUNC); Commander in Chief Combined Forces Command (CINCCFC); Commander, United States Forces Korea (CDRUSFK); Commander, Eighth United States Army (CDREUSA); Commander, Ground Component Command of UNC; Commander Ground Component Command of CFC; and Senior U.S. Military Officer in Korea.
- In his role as CINCUNC he has a special relationship with the United States and the UN. He receives his strategic guidance and direction only from the U.S. JCS, which acts as agent for the U.S. National Command Authority (NCA). The U.S. NCA was designated by the United Nations Security Council in 1950 as its agent for military action in Korea.
- In his role as CINCCFC it is interesting to note he does not report directly to any single U.S. or ROK military authority, but rather to the binational Military Committee of which in his role as Senior

Military Officer in Korea, he is one of two members of the permanent session.

- As CINCCFC he has OPCON of major ROK forces in peacetime, and takes OPCON of U.S. combat forces upon declaration of prescribed defense conditions (DEFCON). The ROK JCS takes unilateral OPCON of ROK forces for counter infiltration measures.

If there is a bottom line to all of this it is the following; the senior U.S. military commander in ROK through a complex command relationship receives his guidance directly from the U.S. NCA via U.S. JCS, passes this guidance to himself in whatever capacity is appropriate, exercises command of U.S. combat forces only when specific DEFCONs are established, and has a blurred command relationship with CINCPAC, the U.S. regional warfighting CINC.

WESTCOM, on the other hand, serves as the U.S. Army component headquarters in PACOM and exercises command of Army units within the AOR, except 8th U.S. Army in Korea and U.S. Army, Japan. WESTCOM major units are the 25th Infantry Division, U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii, and 45th Support Group. The two most critical areas in the Pacific, Japan and Korea, are not represented directly by the PACOM army component command.

IS IT TIME FOR A CHANGE

The purpose of this appraisal is not to outline how the ROK command scheme developed but rather to look at where we are now in Korea and offer some suggestions for possible adjustments to defense planning. In doing this it is appropriate to comment on the results of past policy and provide analysis concerning what has been accomplished in Korea, at what cost, and in what position are we in now? Finally, I will discuss current U.S. troop dispositions in Korea in relation to the best strategic posture for U.S. ground forces in the Pacific.

The purpose of U.S. forces in the ROK is to deter invasion from the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (PDRK). While this serves as a short term commitment it is not the end state of U.S. national policy. Therefore the question becomes, does the U.S. presence promote an atmosphere conducive to a normalization of North-South relations?

The first part of the analysis deals with the question, to what extent has the U.S. presence deterred a PDRK attack? History and recent experience support the argument of effective deterrence. There is no doubt U.S. presence has deterred PDRK large-scale aggression over the past 30

years. Other factors now play in the deterrence issue. The comparative economic strength of the ROK relative to the PDRK serve as deterrence. The ROK has developed large scale heavy industry and an international trade network that would stand them in good stead in the event of war with the North. Growth in regional concerns for stability by both the USSR and China have reined in Kim Il Sung's willingness to attempt an unsupported invasion of the South. Japan's role as an economic superpower particularly in the Pacific has provided an indirect stabilizing effect on North-South relations.

Several factors bear on the long term normalization question. As of 1958 there were no foreign forces in the PDRK. The PDRK contains half the population of the ROK but devotes 2 - 4 times the amount of their GNP to military spending as does the ROK. Past U.S. economic subsidies (military forces, base maintenance, and economic aid) have enabled the ROK to incur minimum defense expenditures while enjoying maximum protection. The result has been little economic pressure on the South to respond to the North's force reduction overtures. Additionally, the South has been able to expand its defense related and other industries under the umbrella of U.S. defense guarantees. The absence of U.S. forces would force the ROK government to choose

between the sacrifices necessary to match PDRK defense expenditures or respond to growing complex mixtures of anti-communist pro unification emotions in the South. Finally, withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from ROK would force Kim Il Sung and the PDRK's hand in recognition of the South without overt foreign military presence, a long standing PDRK precondition to negotiations.

Any appraisal of U.S. defense policy in the Pacific must include consideration of Soviet Union and China interests in the region. Sino-Soviet congruity in regional support relationships are strained at best. However, it is safe to assume for the foreseeable future, regional stability is in the interest of both the USSR and China. Both nations are focused on the need to revitalize internal economic conditions. Supporting a regional war in Korea jeopardizes relations with the United States, Japan and South Korea. All of these countries play a major economic role not only in the region but inter-nationally as well.

Finally, what risk is involved with current U.S. force positioning in Korea? The 2d U.S. Infantry division is stationed north of Seoul along the primary invasion routes moving from north to south. Certainly any large scale PDRK invasion will involve the U.S. division if in no other role

than self defense. The trip wire position of these forces precludes much needed flexibility in U.S. decision making as to the commitment of U.S. forces to a war in Korea. Command relationships outlined earlier provide for unilateral ROK decisions to use military force in several plausible scenarios -- border incidents, claims to off-shore islands, or particularly onerous acts of sabotage against key ROK or U.S. installations or leaders -- all could draw the United States into war against its better judgment.

Several new factors emerge when the scope of this analysis is changed from one focused only on Korea to a broader perspective of U.S. Army flexibility to respond to demands in other parts of the Pacific. From a geo-strategic framework one cannot overlook the relative value to the United States of the prosecution of a regional war from Japan vis a vis the peninsula of Korea. The potential for containment of Soviet Naval forces by controlling the strategically vital straits separating the islands of Japan are well known to regional planners. War in Korea can be fought and forces sustained from Japan as history has repeatedly proven. On the other hand, forces tied to the defense of a relatively small peninsula of mainland Asia reduce U.S. flexibility in force deployment to other critical and sensitive regions.

The effects of this thinking concerns primarily U.S. Army defense planning. Navy, Air Force and Marine planners have long recognized the risks inherent in large scale stationing of forces in Korea. The Air Force operates primarily out of Japan and the Philippines, Naval forces are home ported out of Yokuska, Japan and Subic Bay in the Phillipines, Marine forces are stationed in Okinawa. These forward basing decisions provide increased flexibility for the PACOM CINC in the accomplishment of his duties throughout the Pacific. U.S. Army commitments to Korea, on the other hand, have absorbed significant amounts of resources and provided a relatively inflexible Army response capability. This coupled with unique command relationships involving Korea, Japan and WESTCOM provide less than adequate army component representation at PACOM headquarters.

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding review has shown a continuing and growing interest by the United States in the Pacific. Unfortunately, while certainly demonstrating an interest, we have not always maintained a commitment. Our interests have led to what some have termed "strategic overreach" in the early part of the 20th century. The United States presence in China in the 1900s coupled with our almost accidental involvement in the Philippines satisfied early desires for expansionism supported by economic interests. American commitment was reduced when events in Europe leading to WW I coupled with Japanese expansionism signaled by the Russo-Japanese war forced us to examine our national interests and develop a "Europe First" strategy. The army did however, manage to shake off its frontier mindset and develop a global logistics capability that would serve it well in the future.

Post-WW I isolationism and the philosophy of peace through arms reductions laid the groundwork for the Washington Naval Treaty. The results of this treaty forced the United States to maintain a limited two ocean capability while allowing the Japanese to concentrate their force in the Pacific. Reduced defense expenditures, particularly as

applicable to the Army, caused the United States to again retreat from their Pacific interests.

Post-WW II finds the United States with world wide commitments in both Europe and Asia. Unfortunately we failed to recognize the impact of our own rhetoric on the emerging nations of Asia. The Wilsonian statements leading to the League of Nations and Roosevelt/Truman open-ended commitments in the Allied Conferences of WW II left the United States in an awkward position when dealing with Pacific Rim nations. We failed to recognize the social upheaval taking place in China. We were unprepared for the Korea question and in our haste to halt the spread of communism, were drawn into a civil war in Vietnam.

American defense commitments in the Pacific have not changed significantly from the end of WW II. Our troop concentrations, with the exception of the Vietnam War, have not changed since the Korean War. However Asian nationalism has grown significantly, and as stated earlier, the United States economic center of gravity thus her national interests have shifted to the Pacific.

Army participation in PACOM is represented by three different headquarters: United States Army Japan, Eighth United States Army in Korea, and the United States Army

Western Command. The two most critical areas in the Pacific, Japan and Korea, are not represented directly by the PACOM army component command.

The purpose of U.S. forces in the ROK is to deter invasion from the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (PDRK). While this serves as a short term commitment it is not the end state of U.S. national policy. U.S. national policy is to promote an atmosphere conducive to a normalization of North-South relations. U.S. force projection capabilities in the Pacific remain strong with the presence of the U.S. Seventh fleet, U.S. Air Forces in Japan and the Philippines and the III Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa.

Japan's proximity to the Asian mainland and its control of the strategically vital straits separating the islands of Japan are well known to regional planners. War in Korea can be fought and forces sustained from Japan. On the other hand, forces tied to the defense of a relatively small peninsula of mainland Asia reduces U.S. flexibility in force deployment to other critical and sensitive regions.

Navy, Air Force and Marine planners have long recognized the risks inherent in large scale stationing of forces in Korea. Their forward basing provides increased

flexibility for the PACOM CINC in accomplishing his duties throughout the Pacific. U.S. Army commitments to Korea, have absorbed significant amounts of resources and provided a relatively inflexible Army response capability. This coupled to awkward command relationships involving Korea, Japan and WESTCOM provide less than adequate army component representation at PACOM headquarters.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The unsatisfactory Army command structure in the Pacific requires immediate streamlining to produce timeliness and flexibility to the PACOM CINC. The first order of business is the unraveling of the Combined Forces Command from the outdated United Nations command that leads to the dangerous relationship with the ROK forces described earlier in this paper. The UN relationship has served its purpose and now only provides a dangerous commitment for the United States that will reduce US flexibility in the event of war on the Korean peninsula. The mutual defense treaty between the ROK and the United States serves as an adequate basis for the support of US-ROK security in the region.

The combined command relationships between the CINC CFC and the armed forces of Korea should be dissolved. Korean nationalism coupled with the improved state of the Korean armed forces requires this be accomplished at the earliest opportunity. The issue has led to increased internal agitation within the population of Korea and does not foster normalization of relations between the PDRK and the ROK. In addition to the dissolution of the combined command relations serious thought should be given to the withdrawal or at a minimum the re-stationing of the 2d Infantry

Division from its present precarious positions. The division as presently located reduces Army flexibility in responding to other regional contingencies, and will undoubtedly involve the United States in ground action with any advance by PDRK forces across the DMZ. While adjusting command relations and troop basing the US should retain the logistics headquarters and facilities in the southern portion of the ROK, perhaps following arrangements in Europe and "POMCUSing" a divisional set of equipment. This would maintain a logistics base in the ROK and allow for a faster reinforcement of US ground troops if necessary

The US Army should advocate the combining of the two sub-unified commands within the region -- USFORCES-K and USFORCES-J. Headquarters for this regional sub-unified command should be stationed in Japan. This proposal better locates the warfighting commanders of the Navy, Marines and Air Force responsible for implementation of US bilateral defense agreements in the Pacific. A forward element of an army corps headquarters can then be stationed in Korea to continue liaison and defense planning.

With the adjustments suggested above the PACOM Army component command in WESTCOM assumes the primary role in managing army affairs in the Pacific. This provides the

CINCPAC with a single voice concerning Army responsibilities through out the AOR as the commanders of PACFLT and PACAF do currently. Additionally the PACOM Commander is provided additional flexibility in the employment of ground forces throughout the AOR.

The suggestions above are extremely sensitive to Asian political sensitivities throughout the region but if implemented slowly, and in full consultation with our Pacific allies, should be doable. The United States retains its critical commitment to stability in the Pacific while recognizing the changes in the region. These adjustments provide for a more succinct use of US defense resources, unify army command and control and provide necessary flexibility to the US Army in meeting its critical responsibilities to the nation.





FIGURE 9. MAJOR COMMANDS AND COMPONENT COMMANDS IN KOREA.



1. CINCCFC HAS OPCON OF MAJOR ROK FORCES IN PEACETIME, AND TAKES OPCON OF U.S. COMBAT FORCES UPON DECLARATION OF PRESCRIBED DEFENSE CONDITIONS (DEFCON). ROK JCS TAKES UNILATERAL OPCON OF ROK FORCES FOR COUNTER INFILTRATION MEASURES.

FIGURE 8. PEACETIME COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS OF THE CFC

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